

INDIGENOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN BOLIVIA

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Introduction

Bolivia has experienced remarkable political transformation since the turn of the 21st century. After centuries of political exclusion, indigenous peoples⁵ helped bring the first nationally successful indigenous political party to power, winning majorities in the legislature and the executive. The MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*, or Movement towards Socialism) and President Evo Morales, who took office in 2005, represented a historic shift in the political power and engagement of indigenous people in Bolivia. Unlike many ethnically based political parties, however, the MAS has adopted an inclusive approach to indigenous identity (Anria, 2013, 2018; Madrid, 2008, 2012).

In this paper we investigate how indigenous people view the political system before and after this historic change in representation. In particular, we focus on indigenous peoples' support for the political system, comparing attitudes of indigenous and non-indigenous people before and after the election of Evo Morales and the MAS. The question

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⁵ We use indigenous peoples and indigenous people interchangeably to refer collectively to all peoples descended from the original inhabitants of Bolivia.

of how ethnicity informs generalized support for the political system is important for several reasons. Much of the skepticism about ethnic voting is rooted in the idea that voting along ethnic lines threatens democratic accountability since politicians can count on co-ethnics to vote for them regardless of policy choices or performance. And, although we know from developed democracies that winners tend to be more supportive of the political system, have more trust in government and tend to think the whole electoral process is fairer, discussions of similar trends in developing democracies are much direr, including concerns that ethnic voting gives politicians a blank slate, limits accountability and may undermine support for democratic systems in general.

We argue that ethnic shortcuts can be very important in shaping political attitudes, especially in contexts of historic shifts in representation for previously excluded groups in ethnically divided societies. Ethnicity, however, is not a completely different kind of signal from other political cues and short-cuts. Rather, co-ethnic electoral success provides information to voters about the fairness of the system in much the same way that other in-group political victories do. We expect that co-ethnics will show more support for the political system following a historic electoral victory of an ethnic party, much as other supporters of a winning party would. We do not expect that co-ethnic support is more permanent or more resilient to evidence of wrong-doing, unfairness, or corruption in the long term. Instead, while we expect indigenous people to be more favorable towards the system at first, over time indigenous people –like everyone else– update their evaluations based on many factors. Once the initial excitement of victory wears off, we expect co-ethnics who have direct negative interactions with government to view the system less favorably, contrary to the expectations of the literature that views ethnic voting as inherently less critical than other types of support, especially the more time passes from an electoral shift.

To explore these issues, we take advantage of a rare historical occurrence where a shift in the importance of ethnicity in politics occurred rapidly and relatively visibly – the rise of an ethnically-based political party⁶ (the MAS) in Bolivia which carried the first indigenous president, Evo Morales, to electoral victory in 2005. Using AmericasBarometer⁷ survey data from before and after this historic shift, we can explicitly test competing hypotheses about what shapes attitudes toward government and the political system and the limits of this support. We find no difference in political support between indigenous and non-indigenous people in 2004, before the election, but in 2010, several years into the new administration, we find that indigenous people are significantly more supportive of the political system than everyone else. Although ethnicity is not a significant predictor of support for the political system before this historic shift in ethnic representation in Bolivia, after 2005 self-identifying as indigenous is one of the strongest predictors of positive support for the political system. This boost in support, however, is not permanent. Several years later, in 2017, there is no difference in system support between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians and the boost in generalized support for the system that the election of an indigenous president provided fades.

We also explore the conditional factors that limit indigenous support for the political system over time. Follow-

⁶ There is some debate over whether the MAS counts as an ethnically based political party. The MAS has certainly made political and electoral claims based on ethnicity, and both Van Cott (2007) and Yashar (2005) identify it as an ethnically based political party, but Madrid points out that, unlike more traditional ethnic based parties, MAS draws on populist strategies and more inclusive mobilization which is possible in Bolivia because of the fluid nature of ethnic identities (Madrid 2008, 2012). Either way, the electoral victories of the MAS represented a major change in the representation of indigenous people in government, and we are interested in how that affects attitudes of people who self-identify as indigenous.

⁷ We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

ing the election, indigenous people are more supportive even if they did not personally vote for the MAS and even if they have experienced government corruption, but by 2017 there are substantial differences in support between indigenous supporters of the MAS and indigenous non-supporters and between indigenous people who have experienced corruption and those who have not.

Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, Corruption and System Support

In the wealthier, older democracies of the world, there is abundant evidence that supporters of winning politicians tend to have more positive attitudes toward the political system than supporters of losers. Supporters of winners tend to be more trusting of the political system (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002) and have generally more positive attitudes toward the government and the overall political system (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Anderson and LoTempio, 2002; Anderson and Mendes, 2006; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). For the most part, this difference in attitudes in developed democracies is seen as evidence that people's personal feelings of loss or gain contaminate their overall evaluations of system fairness, but not as evidence that democracy as a whole is in trouble.

In democracies of the developing world, however, these same dynamics are often accompanied by greater concern over the potential for negative attitudes about the system – especially among those who lose an election – to spill over into a larger crisis of democratic legitimacy and stability. Gaps in attitudes between winners and losers tend to be larger in developing countries than in developed countries (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson, 1998) and scholars tend to emphasize how these gaps have the potential to signal instability and perhaps crisis. For example, elections in developing countries are much more likely to be accompanied by opposition initiated protests and boycotts (Beaulieu,

2014) and losers in developing countries are more likely to protest than their counterparts in developed countries (Anderson and Mendes, 2006). Similarly, there is evidence that electoral losers have less trust in political institutions, and are more critical of government and politicians, but electoral winners are much more uncritical in their support for politicians, raising concerns about accountability (Moehler, 2009). Being a member of a winning majority or a losing minority also continues to affect political support even in the face of major institutional changes (Cho and Bratton, 2006).

Similarly, evaluations of race and ethnicity in wealthy developed countries tend to focus on the benefits to minorities or excluded groups of gaining representation, not the threat of "ethnic politics" weakening democracy. For example, minorities tend to have more positive evaluations of both the government and the system when they see co-ethnics in office (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004). This framework suggests that minority representatives send cues to co-ethnic constituents that they will be responsive to their collective interests (Abney and Hutcheson, 1981; Bobo, Lawrence and Gilliam Jr., 1990; Bratton and Cho, 2006; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson, 1990; Tate, 2003). As a result, ethnic constituents feel empowered, have greater rates of political participation, trust in government, political knowledge and political efficacy under conditions of expanding representation (Baker and Cook, 2005; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004; Barreto, Segura and Woods, 2004; Bobo, Lawrence and Gilliam Jr., 1990; Dawson, 1994; Gay, 2001; Mansbridge, 1999; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Whitby, 1997).

Discussions of ethnicity and politics in poorer developing countries, however, tend to focus on concerns over legitimacy, corruption and threats to accountability. Scholarly attention to issues of ethnicity and democracy in developing countries is often negative and alarmist. For example, identity voting along ethnic lines has been seen a key bar-

rier to successful democratic politics (Horowitz, 2001; Ra-bushka and Shepsle, 1972) and as the main problem facing democratic institutions (Lijphart, 1977). Political parties organized along ethnic lines are thought to be more conflictual, less stable and less democratic than political parties that cross-cut political divides and span across ethnic divisions rather than reinforce them (Horowitz, 1985). Within this framework, ethnic individuals are thought to lend blind support to ethnic political parties to reinforce group psychological bonds of attachment even in the face of weak pre-forming government.⁸

One reason why the political importance of ethnicity might be different in poorer, younger democracies is high levels of corruption. If the institutional context of democracy is viewed as unfair, then the potential harm one group can do to another is more severe, perhaps exacerbating tensions between groups. As a result, there seems to be some interesting interactions between corruption, ethnicity and partisanship. Previous research has highlighted that people living in more corrupt countries have lower levels of trust in civil servants than people living in less corrupt countries (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003) and corruption also leads to lower levels of diffuse support for the political system (Seligson, 2002). People, however, may be more forgiving of corruption within their own party. For example, experimental evidence from Spain shows partisan bias in attitudes toward corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz,

⁸ More recently, scholarship has focused on the complicated ways that ethnic identities inform politics. Ferree (2010), in her book on South Africa, argues that what looks like a clear ethnic census in elections "is in fact *politically engineered*, the end result of a negative framing strategy employed by the ruling party to neutralize its competition". Likewise, recent work on ethnic political parties takes issue with the characterization that parties that invoke ethnic identities are incompatible with democracy (Chandra, 2005). In Latin America, Madrid has argued that ethnic political parties may actually benefit democracy through increased political participation and engagement (Madrid, 2005b). Although the rise of ethnic parties has changed politics in Latin America, it is by no means clear that the change is for the worse (Madrid, 2005b, 2005a, 2005c).

2013). People who voted for the winner in corrupt countries are more trusting than people who voted for the loser, and winners' trust is less affected by corruption than losers' trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). This paper builds on this existing literature and explores how attitudes toward the political system are shaped by ethnic identity, winning and losing, and personal experiences with corruption in the unusual context of the first election in which an ethnic political party competes for office and wins.

Bolivia, because of the election of an indigenous president after a long history of excluding indigenous people, is an interesting place to explore these issues in a democracy in the developing world. Two recent papers use survey data from Bolivia to explore how ethnicity might affect more generalized attitudes about the political system. The first, written by Huebertand Liu (2017), focuses on trust in the supreme court. They find that before the election of Evo Morales, indigenous people are less trusting of the court than white or mestizo respondents. In 2010, several years into the administration, in contrast, there is no difference between groups. They take the 2010 lack of difference between indigenous people and white or mestizo people as evidence that having an indigenous government in power has equalized attitudes about the judiciary. Second, Madrid and Rhodes-Purdy (2016) finds that indigenous people are more supportive of the political system in Bolivia following the election of Evo Morales, but find little support for a similar bump among women in countries with female presidents or even for indigenous people in other Latin American countries with indigenous leaders, something they attribute to the clear claim that Morales made as an indigenous president.

Both of these papers show that co-ethnicity is associated with more support for political institutions in some circumstances, but offer little in terms of understanding the limits of ethnicity compared with other factors that shape system support. We expand on their analysis to compare ethnicity with partisanship and also to test the limits of co-ethnic

support in the face of difficult personal experiences with corruption. In the next section, we lay out our argument that ethnicity is one of many useful –but not determinative– factors that people use as shortcuts for evaluating political systems, as well as the specific hypotheses we will test.

Ethnicity, Partisanship and System Support: Theory and Hypotheses

We argue that both ethnicity and the success of a favored political party can be useful ways in which people evaluate how well a political system is working for them. That is, people who see co-ethnics win elections are likely to experience a similar boost in support for the political systems to people who see their favored party win an election, regardless of ethnicity. Neither of these factors, however, is stronger than direct experiences with the political system –we expect personal experience with corruption to counteract, or at least dampen, both of these more positive heuristics. Corruption can dampen political system support because co-ethnics and co-partisans begin to see that the political system is not working fairly, effectively or efficiently.

Ethnicity can be an important and useful tool for mobilizing political support and an important factor in shaping attitudes toward government and support for the political system. This is especially true in countries where ethnicity is politically important, where political parties campaign along ethnic lines, and where longstanding political divisions have an ethnic dimension. But we know that individuals who vote for winning political parties (political winners) also have increased positive evaluations of the political system. In other words, ethnicity can be a particularly powerful heuristic in some circumstances and seeing co-ethnics assume political office can encourage more positive attitudes toward the political system, much the same way that seeing your political party win an election often leads to more positive attitudes toward the political system.

H1: Following the election of Evo Morales, we expect indigenous peoples in Bolivia to hold more positive views of the political system than non-indigenous Bolivians.

We also expect that the excitement of a historic election of a member of a marginalized group will have a declining effect on generalized political support. Shortly after the election, we expect that indigenous people will be more supportive than non-indigenous people, but we do not expect that effect to last indefinitely. The waning support could be due to a changing perspective among indigenous people, whose demands may have begun to grow beyond simply having a co-ethnic president. Similarly, the effect of descriptive representation may fade with time, particularly as criticism of the Morales administration begins to attenuate support.

H2: We expect indigenous peoples to hold very positive attitudes toward the political system after the first election of Evo Morales, but that the difference between indigenous and non-indigenous attitudes will narrow with time.

Finally, we will also test conditional hypotheses to explore the relative importance of these factors in shaping attitudes toward the political system. Indigenous people may be more supportive in the short term, even if they did not directly vote for the MAS or even if they have experienced corruption, but we do not expect that generalized favorability to last indefinitely. We expect that indigenous people will become more critical of the political system as the time from the initial electoral victory increases.

We disagree, however, that ethnicity leads to more blind support for co-ethnic political leaders. Although co-ethnics may view the political system more favorably when their ethnic group is in power, personal experience with corruption can erode these differences, especially as time from a historic election passes. The source of co-ethnic support is

not blind psychological attachment, but rather a signal that the system is more open and fairer than previously thought. One implication of this argument is that co-ethnic citizens are not automatically less critical of the system in the face of evidence of unfairness or corruption. People of any ethnicity who experience their government failing them in personal and important ways are likely to be less supportive of the political system.

We argue that most citizens want democratic government to work efficient and fairly. When disruptions of this norm occur in very personal ways, like personally experiencing a corrupt act, these experiences are likely to erode confidence in the political system and process (Chang and Chu, 2006; Della Porta, 2000; Rose, Mishler, and Haerper, 1998; Seligson, 2002). Thus, when citizens have personal encounters with corruption, regardless of ethnicity or political party and even under conditions of extreme divisions, they are less likely to see the political process as fair and just. Immediately after a historic election, we expect indigenous people to be more forgiving, but, as time passes, we expect indigenous people to evaluate the political system based on these personal experiences much as any other citizen would.

H3: The effect of corruption will have a stronger negative effect on attitudes of indigenous peoples the longer the time from the initial election of Evo Morales.

We do not expect ethnicity to erase the importance of partisan attachments or the effect of voting for the winning political party. Rather, we see ethnicity as one potentially useful heuristic that can function much like partisan cues or attachment. Political winners often feel that their vote made a difference in ushering their favored candidate to political office, which typically translates into more positive political evaluations. We expect these boosts in positive attitudes to persist in deeply divided societies and hold even

for non-ethnic winners. In this sense, winning and ethnic attachments are separate mechanisms, both of which can be important for political attitudes and evaluations. For example, a co-ethnic may experience a boost in positive feelings toward the political system upon seeing someone of their own ethnicity in power, even if they voted for someone else –especially if it was a new or unusual occurrence. Likewise, we expect people who voted for the winning party will have more positive attitudes regardless of ethnicity.

Once the initial excitement of the first indigenous president fades, we expect indigenous people to become more divided in their evaluations of government. Although most indigenous people experienced a positive boost in the attitudes toward government as Evo Morales came to power, over time people have different personal experiences and some are likely to become more critical.

H4: We expect that as time from the first election passes, indigenous peoples will become more divided in their evaluations of the political system.

Why Bolivia?

The question of how support for the political system has developed and evolved in Bolivia for indigenous peoples is particularly important given that they have suffered a long history of exclusion, discrimination, and economic hardship. Although the combined populations of the Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní and Amazonian peoples make up a majority of the population of Bolivia, they experience much harder lives than their non-indigenous counterparts. In the 1990s, indigenous communities were poorer, had poorer housing, less access to sanitation services, and less education (Liberato, Pomeroy and Fennell, 2006). Indigenous people were also likely to die younger and more likely to suffer the loss of their children at a young age (Robles, 1996). Politically, indigenous people were also excluded and marginalized from

the political process (Albro, 2006; Van Cott, 2000, 2007; Yashar, 1999, 2005).

Signs of change began to emerge in the early 2000s. First, following major decentralization reforms in the late 1990s, indigenous candidates gained ground in local elections, winning representation on city and municipal councils and governments. At the same time, a new political party entered the scene, claiming to represent the interests of the poor and indigenous majority of Bolivians. This new party of the MAS made impressive gains by offering an alternative to a political party system that was widely viewed as in crisis. While the MAS originated in the highlands, merging the indigenous movement and the coca grower's unions, it expanded across the country, forging alliances with peasant organizations and indigenous movement leaders in the low-lands and garnering support in urban spaces like El Alto among the Aymara majority population (Anria, 2018). In 2005, the MAS candidate, Evo Morales, won the presidency, becoming the first Bolivian president to win a majority of votes, and the first indigenous president. The same year, the MAS won a majority in the national legislature and made huge gains in local elections.

The election of Evo Morales brought no less than a monumental shift in Bolivian politics. In a country where the colonial imprint had structurally favored the colonizing Spaniards and disadvantaged the Natives, prior to the election of Morales, Bolivia had been historically governed by a dominant white minority to the detriment of an indigenous majority. While indigenous people gained the right to vote in the 1952 revolution, and other measures were passed to further increase democratic participation of indigenous people, such as the Law of Popular Participation of 1994 (Mayorga, 2006; Zuazo Oblitas, Faguet and Bonifaz Moreno, 2012), none of these changes were successful in substantially incorporating the indigenous voice into Bolivian politics, and indigenous communities continued

to suffer marginalization and discrimination. These incremental changes, where indigenous people were acknowledged by the law but not fully recognized into the political machinery, produced an ethnic affirmation that questioned the foundations of the social pact and fed an expectation of change that culminated –but did not end– with the victory of Evo Morales (Loayza Bueno, 2014).

More bluntly, Morales' victory occurred in a context where just decades earlier Bolivians of Morales' class and skin color weren't allowed to vote. MAS and Evo Morales' political party won an unprecedented 53.74% during the 2005 election with an indigenous majority as his base. According to a 2006 Lapop survey, Evo Morales and the MAS won 71% of the vote of self-identified indigenous people, 51% of the vote of self-identified mestizos, and 32% of self-identified whites (Madrid 2014). Since then, the MAS has dominated Bolivian politics winning every single major election. While there is some discussion over whether the MAS can be included as an ethnically based political party, the party's platform sought to woo indigenous voters through ethnic appeals, drawing on indigenous symbols and histories, and developing strong links to indigenous leaders and organizations, and embracing the demands of indigenous movements –land reform and multicultural education among them. Moreover, as part of its populist rhetoric, the MAS criticized the traditional parties and elites and introduced themselves as the outcast who would serve the interest of the poor and indigenous (Madrid, 2014).

After taking office, Morales used constitutional reform to push for a radical re-interpretation of Bolivian national identity. The 2009 constitutional reform set out rights for the indigenous majority, granting more regional and local autonomy to them, and redefined "Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural nation"(BBC, 2016). The number of indigenous people in public office dramatically increased. Moreover, the Linguistic Law of Bolivia (Law N° 269) recognized 36 indigenous languages as the official languages of Bolivia (with

Spanish) and required public workers to speak at least one of these indigenous languages. Other social and public works programs have reduced poverty and extreme poverty by 25% and 43% respectively. This is important in Bolivia given that income and ethnicity are strongly correlated, as those at the bottom of the economic ladder have historically been indigenous. However, while there have been important changes in the political, social and economic structures of Bolivia since Morales took power, the length of his tenure is a matter of great debate in Bolivia. While he remains somewhat popular, levels of support are not the same as those in his early years. Schilling-Vacaflor (2011) noted that while the new Bolivian basic law of 2009 contributed to considerable changes in the social, political, economic and symbolic order, there are still major factors that limit a fully participatory and pluralist democracy.

In 2016, a major defeat to the Morales administration came with a referendum that asked the electorate if he should be allowed to stand for a fourth term in office. The constitutional amendment was defeated by 51% to 49%. While a narrow loss, it signals discontent among a growing segment of the population. In part, Morales's popularity has been eroded in the last few years by corruption scandals at higher and lower levels of government as well as accusations of authoritarianism. Another challenge to the continuation of the Morales administration and the support he receives from the population, and one somewhat understudied, is the changes that the indigenous populations have themselves undergone since 2005. Indigenous people have transformed in how they situate themselves in the social and political arena. The political and economic transformation that opened institutional channels for the participation of the indigenous population has also brought with it the incentives necessary for these communities to want to be better informed of their rights and use them. In this extraordinary context, we are interested in the political attitudes of indigenous people, especially related to

their overall support for the political system that once excluded them.

Research Design

We explore these hypotheses using three waves of survey data from the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) for Bolivia: 2004, the year before Evo Morales was elected; 2010, the year after his sweeping re-election to a second term; and 2016–2017, more than a decade into the indigenous administration and shortly after a constitutional referendum vote that would have allowed Morales to run for a third presidential term.⁹

Dependent Variable

We are interested in generalized support for the political system as a way of getting at attitudes about how well the political system is working. The index we use is based on five questions about trust and confidence in Bolivian institutions, including a question about guarantees for a fair trial, respect for political institutions, pride in the Bolivian political system, support for the system, and trust in the police. We recognize that these questions are far from perfect, and there are many possible ways to measure the attitudes we are interested in. We choose this index because the questions tend to track together and because we think the content of the questions gets close to the idea we are focused

⁹ We use these years for clarity of presentation, but the models are consistent across all the years available for the survey. Included in the appendix is an analysis of the full panel: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016/17. Note that, like in 2004, the results for 2006 indicate that there is no significant difference in how indigenous people and non-indigenous groups feel about the political system. Given that Morales was elected just months prior to the surveys (conducted in March and April), some might find this puzzling. However, given the context of high political instability in the country the years prior, it is not that surprising that indigenous voters were still somewhat disillusioned and skeptical of the political system overall. Additionally, the fact that the sign of the coefficient changes to positive from 2008 on suggests that indigenous people are only more supportive after seeing a government that did more for them, not simply in the aftermath of the election.

on: peoples' overall orientation and sense of support for the political system they live in. This question is particularly important during times of massive political upheaval when institutions are facing new changes and challenges (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez, 2014).

Our dependent variable is support for the political system. To measure political system support we use the Seligson political support-alienation scale. As Muller, Jukam and Seligson (1982) note, this measure provides a more objective measure of diffuse political system support than other measures of trust in government. This mean index combines five items asking respondents to rank the following on a scale from 1-7:

- To what extent do you think the courts in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?
- To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Bolivia?
- To what extent do you feel proud of living in the Bolivian political system?
- To what extent do you think that one should support the Bolivian political system?
- To what extent do you trust the police?

Combining these variables yields a new variable (political system support) that ranges from 1-7, with higher values indicating more favorable levels of political system support.¹⁰

Independent and Control Variables

Ethnic Identity (Indigenous): We create a dichotomous variable from an indicator that asks respondents to self-identify their racial category. All respondents were coded as a 1

¹⁰ These five indicators are highly correlated and produce a scale reliability correlation of .75 in 2004, .72 in 2010 and .75 in 2017. Combining these variables yields a new variable (political system support) that ranges from 1-7, with higher values indicating more favorable levels of political system support.

if they self-identified as being indigenous or “original” and 0 if the respondent identified as a member of another racial group (white, mestizo, black, mulatto or other).

Political Winners and Losers: Since we are looking to test the extent to which co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic winners and losers feel differently about the political system, controlling for ethnicity, we use a retrospective vote choice, whereby all individuals were asked to recall who they voted for in the last election. We coded all individuals that identified Morales as a political winner (1) and all non-MAS retrospective vote choices are classified as political losers (0).

Corruption: Our measure of corruption captures the extent to which citizens have directly been asked to pay bribes by either the police or a government official. Previous research has noted that corruption can have both negative effects on national economies (Elliott, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Weyland, 1998) and reduce levels of trust and perceptions of legitimacy in the political system and institutions (Seligson, 2002; Canache and Allison, 2005). Our measure of corruption is based on two different questions from the survey. The first asks: Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? The second focuses on government officials: In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? Responses to these yes/no questions were recoded so that positive responses to either question indicates experience with corruption.

We also include control variables for several other political factors that might shape support for the political system including ideology political orientation,¹¹ interpersonal

¹¹ Ideology is captured by the following indicator: Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on a 10-point scale? Higher values indicate more left leaning ideological self-placement.

trust,¹² civil society participation,¹³ rural locality,¹⁴ poverty (asset index),¹⁵ respondents level of education, where higher values indicate higher levels of respondent education, and also if the respondent had lost their job in the last year.

We test our hypotheses in a series of multilevel models. Multilevel models are increasingly popular for survey data, acknowledging that context has important implications for individual political evaluations and outcomes (Fitzgerald and Wolak, 2014; Snijders, 2011; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Wolak, 2014). Multilevel models allow us to handle both individual and contextual level data and account for variance in our dependent variable at both the individual and municipal levels. We use municipal level data because municipalities are important levels of governance in Bolivia and important levels for organizing in both rural and urban localities. Table 1 represents a baseline estimate of the amount of variance of system support at the individual and municipal levels.

¹² We include a measure of interpersonal trust constructed from an indicator that asks respondents the following: Speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy? More trusting values are coded high with lower trusting values coded low.

¹³ Participation in civil society can have significant effects on individual political behavior and how individuals view the political system (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez, 2014). Thus, we control for civil society participation using a dichotomous measure composed of the following set of questions: Do you attend: Meetings of any religious organization? Meetings of a parents' association at school? Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Meetings of a political party or political organization? If respondents indicated that they never attended a meeting they were coded as a 0 and if respondents noted that they attended any of the meetings above in the last year, they were coded as a 1. Alternatively, we ran models with a mean and additive index of civil society participation and the results still hold.

¹⁴ The AmericasBarometer considers an area rural if the population is less than 20,000 individuals. This variable is coded "1" for rural municipalities and "0" for urban.

¹⁵ To capture poverty, we use a poverty measure that is derived from principle components factor analysis of various assets individuals own including a color television, refrigerator, telephone, washing machine, microwave, electricity, drinking water, sewerage connection, and bicycle (Cordova 2008).

The constant in Table 1 indicates the mean level of system support within each individual sample year (model 1 for 2004, model 2 for 2010, model 3 for 2017) and in a model where we pool all survey years (model 4). For example, the mean level of system support in 2004 was 3.7 and was about .4 points greater in 2010 (4.1) and dropped to 3.9 in 2017. Pooling all years, the data notes that the mean level of system support was 3.7 over the three sample years.

The variance components indicate that there is a significant amount of variance at both the individual and municipal level. More than 87% of the variance is located at the individual level in 2004, 84% in 2010, 96% in 2017 and around 88% in the pooled sample, with the remaining variance situated at the municipal level. These findings suggest that a multilevel model is a useful approach as it permits explanation of cross municipal differences while controlling for individual differences that account for the majority of variance in system support.

Table 1.
System Support Analysis of Variance

| | 2004 | 2010 | 2017 | Pooled |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Fixed Effects | | | | |
| Municipal level (τ_{00}) | 3.715*** (0.050) | 4.151*** (0.047) | 3.936*** (0.049) | 3.715*** (0.050) |
| Variance Components | | | | |
| Individual level (σ^2) | 0.395*** (0.040) | 0.430*** (0.043) | 0.245*** (0.048) | 0.395*** (0.040) |
| Municipal level (τ_{00}) | 1.050*** (0.014) | 0.987*** (0.014) | 1.278*** (0.024) | 1.050*** (0.014) |
| Percent of the variance at the municipal level | 12.36% | 15.94% | 3.53% | 12.36% |
| -2 x Log Likelihood | -4213.82 | -3860.92 | -2548.87 | -4213.82 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project.

Results

Our ethnicity hypothesis predicts that after a major electoral shift in favor of an ethnic party, co-ethnics should have greater levels of system support when compared to people of other ethnicities. In our case, we expect that indigenous Bolivians will report higher generalized support for the political system after the historic election of Evo Morales and the MAS. In Table 2 we test this hypothesis by modeling the effects of ethnicity on political system support in 2004 (before the election) and 2010 (several years into the administration) individually and in a pooled model. The results indicate that in 2004 there is no significant difference in how indigenous people and non-indigenous groups feel about the political system. In 2010, however, ethnicity becomes an important factor in shaping support for the political system. In this 2010 model, indigenous people have greater levels of system support when compared to non-indigenous people. To test this difference more rigorously, we pool the data into a single model and include an interaction term (indigenous* 2010) to test the extent to which there is a statistically significant difference in system support between the two years. The results support our first hypothesis: In 2010, indigenous peoples are more supportive of the political system than non-indigenous people and the slope of the indigenous variable is significantly different in 2010 when compared to 2004.

We expect that ethnicity can be a useful indication for how well the political system works (and seeing your own previously excluded group come to power is an exciting signal the system may be working better than you thought), but over time other considerations come back in. As the administration stays in power over years, indigenous people – like everyone else – update their attitudes based on a mix of experiences and beliefs. When we look at the 2017 model, indigenous people no longer have significantly different attitudes about the political system than other Bolivians.

Table 2: Ethnicity and System Support


| | 2004 Model | 2010 Model | 2017 Model | Pooled Model |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Indigenous | -0.0228 (0.0635) | 0.312*** (0.0709) | 0.0460 (0.107) | -0.0398 (0.0647) |
| Year Dummy (2010) | | | | 0.389*** (0.0360) |
| Year Dummy (2017) | | | | 0.288*** (0.0636) |
| Indigenous *2010 | | | | 0.374*** (0.0965) |
| Indigenous *2017 | | | | 0.220 (0.115) |
| Left-Right | 0.0735*** (0.0105) | -0.0704*** (0.0113) | -0.000925 (0.0141) | 0.0129 (0.00686) |
| Interpersonal trust | 0.114*** (0.0245) | 0.157*** (0.0270) | 0.145*** (0.0392) | 0.117*** (0.0168) |
| Organizational Participation | 0.125* (0.0539) | 0.0659 (0.0666) | 0.404** (0.125) | 0.169*** (0.0409) |
| Rural | 0.287*** (0.0852) | -0.145 (0.0800) | 0.133 (0.0833) | 0.0882 (0.0470) |
| Wealth (Asset Index) | -0.000903 (0.0170) | 0.0137 (0.0178) | -0.0892*** (0.0268) | -0.00666 (0.0114) |
| Age | -0.00595*** (0.00155) | -0.00170 (0.00157) | -0.0143*** (0.00229) | -0.00687*** (0.00103) |
| Gender (man) | -0.133** (0.0430) | -0.0481 (0.0423) | -0.108 (0.0685) | -0.0970*** (0.0289) |
| Education | -0.00338 (0.00576) | -0.00786 (0.00605) | -0.0631*** (0.00913) | -0.0221*** (0.00391) |
| Constant | 3.210*** (0.141) | 4.261*** (0.147) | 5.070*** (0.196) | 3.824*** (0.0945) |
| Municipal level (τ_{00}) | 0.1343 (0.295) | 0.1470 (0.034) | 0.0202 (0.016) | 0.0694 (0.0136) |
| Number of Municipalities | 82 | 118 | 64 | 187 |
| Number of Observations | 2357 | 2140 | 1297 | 5794 |
| -2 x log likelihood | -3448.79 | -2993.09 | -2087.647 | -8718.21 |

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Figure 1, we plot the predicted margins based on the pooled model for all three years. As this figure notes, in 2004 there is no significant difference in system support between indigenous and non-indigenous people, though non-indigenous people have slightly higher support than indigenous people. But in 2010, we see that indigenous people have more system support (roughly a .3 difference) than non-indigenous people. In 2017, although indigenous people continue to have slightly higher levels of support, the difference is not statistically significant. In all, we find support for our first hypothesis that co-ethnics in general have more positive attitudes toward government than non-co-ethnics following the electoral shift. Indigenous people, after witnessing a historic election of an indigenous party, hold significantly more positive attitudes about the whole political system than non-indigenous people. Comparison of the data over more than a decade into the administration, however, clearly shows that the boost in generalized support for the political system declines over time.

Figure 1.
Indigenous System Support Before and After Election of MAS
 Predictive Margins of Self-Identifying as Indigenous on System Support



Indigenous Identity and Support for MAS

Next, we consider the role of having voted for the MAS. Is our variable for indigenous identity simply measuring the effect of electoral winners feeling more supportive of the system? The simple answer is no. In this dataset, there are respondents in all categories: co-ethnic supporters, non-supporters, electoral winners and electoral losers, as noted in Tables 3A and 3B.

Table 3A.
Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, 2010

| | Indigenous | Non-Indigenous | Total |
|----------------|------------|----------------|-------|
| MAS supporters | 327(90%) | 940(59%) | 1267 |
| Non-MAS | 37(10%) | 643(41%) | 680 |
| Total | 364 | 1583 | |

Pearson chi2(1) = 120.7698 Pr = 0.000

Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous people who are/are not MAS supporters.

Table 3B.
Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, 2017

| | Indigenous | Non-Indigenous | Total |
|----------------|------------|----------------|-------|
| MAS supporters | 125(86%) | 545(65%) | 670 |
| Non-MAS | 20(14%) | 296(35%) | 316 |
| Total | 145 | 841 | |


Pearson chi2(1) = 26.0155 Pr = 0.000

Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous people who are/are not MAS supporters.

On one hand, people who feel like winners in the political process may feel their vote counted in getting their favored candidate into office, and may also feel more positive about the political system in general. On the other hand, losers in the political process may feel more negative about

the political system and political process since their favored candidate did not win political office. Do co-ethnics and winners and losers view the political system differently? We model this in 2010,¹⁶ after the electoral victory of the ethnic political party. We find that both the ethnic identity and the political winner variables are significant, but the effect of having supported the winner is slightly larger than the effect of co-ethnicity.

Figure 2A.
Indigenous, Non-Indigenous, Winners and Losers 2010




Obviously, many indigenous people also voted in support of the MAS, so it is important to try to separate out the effects

¹⁶ Ideally, we would also like to be able to compare the effect of ethnicity with voting for the winner in 2004 but the political circumstances of 2003 and 2004 in Bolivia make this a very tricky question. In October of 2003, the elected president Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign amid mass protests. The vice president, Carlos Mesa, took over the presidency but tried (unsuccessfully) to resign several times as protests continued. A referendum was held in 2004, but special presidential elections were not held until 2005, when Evo Morales and the MAS first came to power. Because of these unusual circumstances, it is not clear how we would determine whether a respondent voted for the winner in 2004.

of ethnicity and partisanship. In Figures 3 and 4, we show the margins for the effect of ethnicity, conditioned on winning and losing (see full model in Table 4 in the appendix). The figure shows winners as more supportive of the political system regardless of ethnicity in both 2010 and 2017. Indigenous people are more supportive than non-indigenous people, but the effect of ethnicity is weaker than the effect of having supported the winner. To a large degree our findings are consistent with the existent literature suggesting that winning has a positive effect on the way individuals view the political system. But testing the effects of ethnicity, winning and losing jointly reveals that both co-ethnic and non co-ethnic winners trend in the same positive direction in their immediate evaluations of the political system: both are more supportive of the political system than people who are not indigenous and did not support the MAS.

Figure 2B.
Indigenous, Non-Indigenous, Winners and Losers 2017
 Predictive Margins of Supporting MAS X Indigenous 2017



When we look at political losers, we see some unique moderating effects for system support. The predicted probabili-

ties note that co-ethnic losers (indigenous people who did not report an inclination to vote for the MAS) have higher levels of system support than non-indigenous losers (4.3 and 3.8 respectively) in 2010, but 2010 with 2016/17 shows a clear difference. In 2010, indigenous support was high regardless of having voted for the MAS or not. For non-indigenous people, support was much more tied to having supported the MAS, with supporters feeling more favorably toward the political system. In 2017, however, indigenous attitudes also separate by support for the MAS.

We see a similar change over time when we consider the effect of personal experience with corruption on attitudes about the political system. In 2010, indigenous support is still higher, even for those who have been asked to pay a bribe (Figure 3A). In 2017, however, the difference is much smaller between indigenous bribe victims and non-indigenous bribe victims (Figure 3B).

Figure 3A.
Ethnicity and Bribe Victimization 2010
 Predictive Margins of Bribe X Indigenous 2010





Figure 3B.
Ethnicity and Bribe Victimization 2017
 Predictive Margins of Bribe X Indigenous 2017



Conclusions

Dealing with historical divisions and histories of political exclusion raises interesting questions for any democracy. But in new democracies, when these aggrieved individuals and groups rise to political office, some worry about instability and a decline of legitimacy. We find that these concerns may be too simplistic as they tend to suggest that individuals blindly follow ethnic cues ignoring other factors that we know shape political attitudes and behavior. In this paper, we unpack the effects of ethnicity and partisan support for an ethnic political party in Bolivia. The rise of the MAS presented a unique historical opportunity to test the independent and conditional effects of ethnic and co-partisanship support and we see that both of these identities condition system support in important ways. Both co-ethnics and political winners tend to have higher levels of political system support after significant electoral victories. Non co-ethnics and those that did not vote for the winning

ethnic party have noticeably lower support for the political system.

Importantly, however, we also find little evidence that the support of political winners and co-ethnics is unconditional over the long term. As the results from the 2016 referendum demonstrate, indigenous people are not uniformly supportive of the Morales administration. Roughly 21% of indigenous peoples voted *no* on the referendum that would have allowed Morales to run for an additional term. Perhaps more telling, 10% of indigenous voters left their ballots blank, possibly a sign of unwillingness to vote *yes*, but also reluctance to vote against the indigenous party. Overall, we see stronger support for Morales from indigenous people than from non-indigenous, but not a uniform response.

Table 4.
Indigenous Support in the 2016 Referendum

| | Indigenous | Non-Indigenous | Total |
|--------------|------------|----------------|-------|
| Voted YES | 103 (53%) | 463 (37%) | 566 |
| Voted NO | 41 (21%) | 443(36%) | 484 |
| Did not vote | 32 (16%) | 177 (14%) | 209 |
| Blank ballot | 20 (10%) | 158 (13%) | 178 |
| Total | 196 | 1241 | |

Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous people who voted yes, no or blank or did not vote.

Although indigenous people are more supportive of the political system in the short term regardless of who they voted for or personal experience with corruption, over time they have become more critical. Rather, we find compelling evidence that personal experiences with corruption dampen the enthusiasm for both ethnic voters and political winners. So, despite evidence that people feel better about the political system when they are getting something positive from

it—either in terms of partisan support of ethnicity, neither of these factors serves as a real buffer against the frustrations that come with being asked to pay a bribe or being confronted with overt corruption in the longer term. This finding is important for two reasons. First, it is a cautionary tale about the damaging effects of corruption on support for the political system, even among those who otherwise might be the most enthusiastic supporters. Second, it also suggests that fears of an ethnic “blank check” of political support for co-ethnics are overstated. Further research could investigate the effects of co-ethnicity on tolerance of authoritarianism and other illiberal attitudes. In regard to support for the political system, however, we find no evidence that the boost in support that co-ethnics experience is any more resistant to updating on the basis of personal experiences than other foundations of support, especially the more time passes from an initial election.

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Appendix

Appendix Table 1.
Summary Statistics

| Summary Statistics | | | | | |
|------------------------------|------|-------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 2004 Survey Year | | | | | |
| System Support Mean Index | 2828 | 3.65 | 1.12 | 1 | 7 |
| Indigenous or Original | 3073 | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Bribe Victimization | 3061 | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| Left/Right Scale | 2530 | 5.19 | 2.09 | 1 | 10 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 3021 | 2.45 | 0.90 | 1 | 4 |
| Organizational Participation | 3070 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Rural | 3073 | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Asset/Quintall Index | 3060 | 2.41 | 1.41 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 3072 | 36.74 | 14.64 | 18 | 84 |
| Male | 3073 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 3073 | 10.43 | 4.51 | 0 | 18 |

| 2010 Survey Year | | | | | |
|------------------------------|------|-------|-------|----|----|
| System Support Mean Index | 2688 | 4.10 | 1.04 | 1 | 7 |
| Indigenous or Original | 3018 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Bribe Victimization | 3005 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Winner (MAS Supporter) | 1970 | 0.64 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Left/Right Scale | 2399 | 5.31 | 2.00 | 1 | 10 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 2946 | 2.62 | 0.85 | 1 | 4 |
| Organizational Participation | 2986 | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Rural | 3018 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Asset/Quintall Index | 2983 | 2.72 | 1.41 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 3016 | 37.15 | 15.09 | 18 | 86 |
| Male | 3018 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 3011 | 10.23 | 4.60 | 0 | 18 |
| 2017 Survey Year | | | | | |
| System Support Mean Index | 1521 | 3.88 | 1.30 | 1 | 7 |
| Indigenous or Original | 1680 | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Bribe Victimization | 1670 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Winner (MAS Supporter) | 986 | 0.68 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Left/Right Scale | 1487 | 5.20 | 2.43 | 1 | 10 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 1610 | 2.43 | 0.88 | 1 | 4 |
| Organizational Participation | 1679 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Rural | 1680 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Asset/Quintall Index | 1585 | 2.94 | 1.43 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 1680 | 39.1 | 15.7 | 18 | 88 |
| Male | 1680 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 1674 | 10.92 | 4.67 | 0 | 18 |

Appendix Table 2.
System Support Analysis of Variance: All Years

| | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2017 | Pooled |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Fixed Effects | | | | | | | | |
| Municipal Level (τ_{00}) | 3.715*** (0.050) | 4.053*** (0.050) | 4.055*** (0.044) | 4.151*** (0.047) | 3.892*** (0.057) | 3.978*** (0.048) | 3.936*** (0.049) | 3.715*** (0.050) |
| Variance Components | | | | | | | | |
| Individual Level (s^2) | 0.395*** (0.040) | 0.385*** (0.041) | 0.388*** (0.036) | 0.430*** (0.043) | 0.472*** (0.046) | 0.370*** (0.039) | 0.245*** (0.048) | 0.395*** (0.040) |
| Municipal Level (τ_{00}) | 1.050*** (0.014) | 1.059*** (0.015) | 0.972*** (0.014) | 0.987*** (0.014) | 1.023*** (0.014) | 0.995*** (0.013) | 1.278*** (0.024) | 1.050*** (0.014) |
| % of the variance at the municipal level | 12.36% | 11.68% | 13.75% | 15.94% | 17.53% | 12.16% | 3.53% | 12.36% |
| -2 x Log Likelihood | -4213.82 | -3844.58 | -3686.30 | -3860.92 | -3807.88 | -4093.28 | -2548.87 | -4213.82 |
| Obs. | 2827.000 | 2565.000 | 2598.000 | 2688.000 | 2589.000 | 2852.000 | 1521.000 | 2827.000 |

Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 3.
Ethnicity and System Support for All Years

| | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2017 | Pooled Model |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Indigenous | -0.0228 (0.0635) | -0.0941 (0.0681) | 0.119 (0.0663) | 0.312*** (0.0709) | 0.109 (0.0730) | 0.0568 (0.0678) | 0.0460 (0.107) | -0.0160 (0.0617) |
| Left-Right | 0.0735*** (0.0105) | 0.0651*** (0.0109) | 0.000673 (0.0106) | -0.0704*** (0.0113) | -0.0264* (0.0104) | -0.00164 (0.0108) | -0.000925 (0.0141) | 0.0129** (0.00425) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.114*** (0.0245) | 0.158*** (0.0268) | 0.131*** (0.0262) | 0.157*** (0.0270) | 0.0848** (0.0287) | 0.153*** (0.0281) | 0.145*** (0.0392) | 0.131*** (0.0107) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | | | | | (0.0940) |
| Indigenous* 2014 | | | | | | | | 0.0719 |
| | | | | | | | | (0.0904) |
| Indigenous* 2017 | | | | | | | | 0.192 |
| | | | | | | | | (0.111) |
| Constant | 3.210*** (0.141) | 3.614*** (0.150) | 3.851*** (0.139) | 4.261*** (0.147) | 4.021*** (0.155) | 4.065*** (0.144) | 5.070*** (0.196) | 3.668*** (0.0643) |
| Municipal Level (τ_{00}) | 0.134 (0.029) | 0.114 (0.028) | 0.120 (0.026) | 0.147 (0.034) | 0.207 (0.043) | 0.130 (0.030) | 0.020 (0.016) | 0.069 (0.009) |
| # of Muni- cipalities | 82 | 83 | 119 | 118 | 86 | 76 | 64 | 2259 |
| # of Obser- vations | 2357 | 1953 | 2055 | 2140 | 2072 | 2178 | 1297 | 14052 |
| -2 x Log Likelihood | -3448.79 | -2848.31 | -2880.89 | -2993.09 | -2946.61 | -3104.83 | -2087.64 | -20698.55 |

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Appendix Table 4.
Winners, Losers, and System Support 2010 and 2017**

| | MAS Supporters 2010 | MAS Supporters 2017 | Winners and Losers by Ethnicity 2010 | Winners and Losers by Ethnicity 2017 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|
| Indigenous | 0.224** (0.0785) | 0.0762 (0.125) | 0.403* (0.193) | 0.0271 (0.293) |
| Winner (MAS Supporter) | 0.607*** (0.0610) | 0.856*** (0.0934) | 0.624*** (0.0631) | 0.851*** (0.0972) |
| Indigenous*Winner (MAS Supporter) | | | -0.210 (0.206) | 0.0597 (0.321) |
| Left/Right | -0.0427** (0.0137) | 0.0201 (0.0170) | -0.0420** (0.0137) | 0.0200 (0.0170) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.182*** (0.0316) | 0.116* (0.0488) | 0.181*** (0.0316) | 0.117* (0.0488) |
| Organizational Partici- pation | 0.0336 (0.0756) | 0.263 (0.149) | 0.0359 (0.0756) | 0.262 (0.149) |
| Rural | -0.307*** (0.0916) | 0.185 (0.0964) | -0.308*** (0.0919) | 0.185 (0.0965) |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Wealth (Asset Index) | 0.0302 (0.0210) | -0.0229 (0.0338) | 0.0300 (0.0210) | -0.0230 (0.0339) |
| Age | -0.00148 (0.00191) | -0.0103*** (0.00303) | -0.00149 (0.00190) | -0.0103*** (0.00303) |
| Gender (Man) | -0.0808 (0.0502) | -0.0593 (0.0856) | -0.0809 (0.0502) | -0.0599 (0.0856) |
| Education | -0.00627 (0.00729) | -0.0357** (0.0111) | -0.00615 (0.00729) | -0.0356** (0.0111) |
| Constant | 3.740*** (0.186) | 3.786*** (0.263) | 3.729*** (0.186) | 3.789*** (0.264) |
| Municipal level (τ_{00}) | 0.150 (0.037) | 0.011 (0.019) | 0.1532 (0.038) | 0.0121 (0.0192) |
| Number of Observations | 1435 | 785 | 1435 | 785 |
| Number of Municipalities | 117 | 64 | 117 | 64 |
| -2 x log likelihood | -1959.58 | -1229.58 | -1959.07 | -1229.57 |

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix Table 5.
System Support and Bribe Victimization 2010

| | Bribe Victim | Bribe Victim & Ethnicity | Bribe Victim, Winners & Losers |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Indigenous | 0.234** (0.0784) | 0.193* (0.0870) | 0.233** (0.0784) |
| Bribe Victimization | -0.223*** (0.0600) | -0.248*** (0.0643) | -0.197* (0.0867) |
| Winner (MAS Supporter) | 0.593*** (0.0608) | 0.593*** (0.0607) | 0.607*** (0.0696) |
| Indigenous*Bribe Victim | | 0.182 (0.169) | |
| Winners*Bribe Victim | | | -0.0469 (0.114) |
| Left/Right | -0.0401** (0.0136) | -0.0404** (0.0136) | -0.0399** (0.0136) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.178*** (0.0315) | 0.178*** (0.0315) | 0.177*** (0.0315) |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Organizational Participation | 0.0464 (0.0753) | 0.0446 (0.0753) | 0.0468 (0.0753) |
| Rural | -0.324*** (0.0923) | -0.325*** (0.0924) | -0.325*** (0.0923) |
| Wealth (Asset Index) | 0.0344 (0.0210) | 0.0348 (0.0210) | 0.0344 (0.0210) |
| Age | -0.00122 (0.00190) | -0.00119 (0.00190) | -0.00125 (0.00190) |
| Gender (man) | -0.0585 (0.0502) | -0.0550 (0.0503) | -0.0579 (0.0502) |
| Education | -0.00427 (0.00728) | -0.00424 (0.00727) | -0.00421 (0.00728) |
| Constant | 3.751*** (0.185) | 3.755*** (0.185) | 3.742*** (0.186) |
| Municipal level (τ_{00}) | 0.1557 (0.038) | 0.1562 (0.038) | 0.1555 (0.038) |
| Number of Municipalities | 117 | 117 | 117 |
| -2 x log likelihood | -1948.76 | -1948.18 | -1948.68 |
| Number of Observations | 1433 | 1433 | 1433 |

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix Table 6.
System Support and Bribe Victimization 2017

| | Bribe Victim | Bribe Victim & Ethnicity | Bribe Victim, Winners & Losers |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Indigenous | 0.0958 (0.124) | 0.210 (0.159) | 0.0940 (0.124) |
| Bribe Victimization | -0.318*** (0.0879) | -0.277** (0.0947) | -0.391** (0.145) |
| Winner (MAS Supporter) | 0.840*** (0.0927) | 0.841*** (0.0926) | 0.797*** (0.114) |
| Indigenous*Bribe Victim | | -0.283 (0.242) | |
| Winners*Bribe Victim | | | 0.113 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | | (0.180) |
| Left/Right | 0.0200 (0.0169) | 0.0191 (0.0169) | 0.0207 (0.0169) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.109* (0.0484) | 0.109* (0.0483) | 0.108* (0.0484) |
| Organizational Participation | 0.298* (0.148) | 0.292* (0.148) | 0.298* (0.148) |
| Rural | 0.174 (0.0946) | 0.178 (0.0941) | 0.178 (0.0946) |
| Wealth (Asset Index) | -0.0202 (0.0335) | -0.0204 (0.0334) | -0.0201 (0.0335) |
| Age | -0.0114*** (0.00302) | -0.0113*** (0.00302) | -0.0113*** (0.00302) |
| Gender (man) | -0.00458 (0.0862) | -0.00242 (0.0862) | -0.00682 (0.0863) |
| Education | -0.0345** (0.0110) | -0.0346** (0.0110) | -0.0343** (0.0110) |
| Constant | 3.919*** (0.263) | 3.902*** (0.263) | 3.942*** (0.266) |
| Municipal Level (τ_{00}) | 0.008 (0.019) | 0.007 (0.018) | 0.008 (0.019) |
| Number of Observations | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Number of Municipalities | 64 | 64 | 64 |
| -2 x log likelihood | -1223.103 | -1222.423 | -1222.906 |

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$